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Abstract 
The different approaches to stadium management adopted by the individual 
cities have been presented in this paper. In this respect particular importance 
was attached to the sources of income that will enable maintenance of these 
venues and pay off the enormous debt incurred by the cities in connection with 
their preparation. 
Introduction 
 Until recently, most mega sports events were held by wealthy industrialised 
countries. Because of the high costs involved in the preparation of such projects, 
insufficiently developed sports and other infrastructure and the absence of 
appropriate legal basis, hosting such events was beyond the reach of developing 
countries. The beginning of the 21st century brought significant changes in this 
respect. On the one hand, countries with relatively weaker economies, aware of 
the benefits involved, submitted their bids more readily. On the other hand, 
institutions responsible for the selection of the host country began to promote 
less wealthy countries or those in the process of economic transformation, in 
order to provide a stimulus for development. Within less than a decade there 
have been a number of examples of sporting event hosts that confirmed the 
current trend, such as: Euro 2004 in Portugal, 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing, 
the decision concerning the staging of the FIFA World Cup in 2010 or, finally, 
Euro 2012 in Poland and Ukraine. 
The different approaches to stadium management adopted by the individual 
cities have been presented in this paper. In this respect particular importance 
was attached to the sources of income that will enable maintenance of these 
venues and pay off the enormous debt incurred by the cities in connection with 
their preparation. 
 
The arenas and their financing 
 
From among the arenas to host the 2012 European Championship only the 
Lech stadium in Poznań was actually in existence in 2007. It was undergoing 
redevelopment not necessitated by awarding of the Euro organisation to the city. 
There were also 2 other stadiums in place (the city stadium in Cracow and the 
Silesian Stadium in Chorzów) which hoped for the award of the Euro 2012 back 
in 2007. However, the candidatures of Cracow and Chorzów were rejected by 
the UEFA and ultimately those facilities could not be qualified in the Euro 2012 
stadium infrastructure. All other stadiums, i.e. in Warsaw, Wrocław, and 
Gdańsk, existed only on paper, in the form of preliminary designs (Table 4.1). 
 
Table 1. 
Characteristics of the stadiums developed under Euro 2012 programme in Poland  
 
Stadium  
location 
Stadium name 
Scope of works 
conducted 
Capacity 
Execution 
[in months] 
Handed over 
for use in 
Gdańsk PGE Arena erection 43 615 31 July 2011 
Poznań 
City Stadium  
in Poznań 
redevelopment 43 098 23 September 2010 
Warsaw National Stadium erection 58 500 38 December 2011 
Wrocław 
City Stadium  
in Wrocław 
erection 44 308 36 September 2011 
 
Source: the author’s own study. 
 
The largest of the all, i.e. the Warsaw stadium, earned the opinion of the most 
complex and advanced structure to be erected in connection with Euro 2012 from 
the very beginning. It was planned to replace the former Decade Stadium in 
Warsaw. Ever since its erection the stadium has become a hallmark of the 
developing capital city. Its patriotically symbolic facade brings to mind the red 
and white flag flapping in the wind. 
Execution of the stadium investments went on without any major 
disturbances. The most serious problems were encountered at the City Stadium 
in Wrocław. The investment stalled for a while because of contract termination 
with the first contractor, Mostostal Warszawa. The Max Bogl company, which 
took over, made up for the delay and completed all phases to the plan. All four 
facilities were handed over for operation at least six months before the onset of 
the tournament finals. The redevelopment of the Poznań stadium took least time. 
Construction from the scratch, on the other hand, was more time consuming. 
The National Stadium in Warsaw took the longest to complete (more than three 
years). The ground piling process alone for that largest of the facilities under 
construction lasted 6 months.  
All the listed facilities share the feature of multifunctionality reflected in 
their extensive auxiliary commercial facilities. The functions are described in 
detail in subchapter 4.3. 
All four stadiums Poland prepared for the Euro 2012 were financed from the 
public funds. The respective proportions between the centrally-provided funds 
guaranteed directly from the state budget and the funds from the municipal 
budgets of individual cities are presented in table 4.2. The table reveals that 
except for the National Stadium entirely financed from the central budget, the 
preparation of all other arenas was based mainly on the funds from the host city 
budgets. This means that the cities are the owners of the facilities and as such 
they have been burdened with the responsibility for the maintenance of the 
arenas after the Euro 2012. The substantial share of the local governments in 
financing the sports facilities stems indirectly from the fact that the actual 
expenses were larger than the original projections. The funds provided from the 
state budget were determined in fixed nominal amounts back in 2008.
1
 The 
expenditure forecasted at the time on preparation of each of the stadiums was 
lower, which automatically translated to a higher share of the central financing. 
The most severe blow of the disproportion was suffered by Wrocław, where the 
actual local expenditure exceeded the original assumptions by nearly ¾ parts. 
 
Table 2.  
The expenditure connected with the preparation of the stadiums for the Euro 2012, and 
the sources of their financing  
 
Stadium Central budget 
Local 
government 
budget 
Total 
expenditure 
incurred 
Expenditure 
forecast in 
2008 
Actual to 
forecast 
expenditure 
                                           
1 Preparation and implementation of Euro 2012, Resolution of the Ministry Council No. 143/2008, 
dated 24 June 2008.  
[mln 
PLN] 
[%] 
[mln 
PLN] 
[%] 
[PLN mln] [PLN mln] ratio 
Gdańsk   144   16.7 718.30 83.3   862.30   684.0 126.1% 
Poznań   110   16.3 565.56 83.7   675.56   537.0 125.8% 
Warsaw 1914 100.0 0 0 1914.00 1220.0 156.9% 
Wrocław   110   12.2 794.22 87.8   904.22   521.1 173.5% 
 
Source: The author’s own study based on the data published by Ministry of Sport and 
Tourism. 
 
Since 2008 the estimates for the construction the stadiums had been 
changing continuously. This was a major obstacle in the establishment of 
specific sources of funds and the necessary amounts obtained from those 
sources. In 2012, despite the advanced stage of construction works, all host 
cities apart from Warsaw were still in the process of completing their final lists 
of sources of finance for the projects underway. 
In the case of Gdańsk, Poznań, and Wrocław, the cities’ substantial share in 
financing stadium preparation works, amounting to over 80%, required 
obtaining funds from external resources. Each of the three cities adopted a 
different solution in this respect: a forfaiting agreement, bond issue, and bank 
loan. The instruments are detailed in table 4.3. 
The most innovative solution was adopted by Gdańsk. In the case of that city 
it was more difficult to obtain a loan because of the risk of exceeding the 
statutory debt limit of 60% of the local governments' revenues. Therefore, an 
alternative method of venue financing was sought. The city chose forfaiting, 
which is a relatively common method of financing of businesses, similar to 
factoring. However, it is less commonly used by local government units in 
Poland, particularly on the scale employed in the case of Gdańsk. It might be 
interesting to look at the mechanism on which the whole operation was based. 
The procedure is presented in Figure 4.1. 
 
Table 3. 
Details of the earmarked external financing obtained by the host cities in preparation 
of the stadium facilities  
 
City Source of financing Financing details 
Gdańsk 
Forfaiting  
 selling of receivables due to city of Gdańsk 
 BIEG is the debtor, 
 purchase price: PLN 375 million, 
 grace period – 3 years (until 2012) 
 the receivable maturity term – 15 years (until 2024) 
 cost – WIBOR 3M + margin 
Revenue Bonds   value of the debt instruments – PLN 94,5 million, 
Poznań 
Bank loans and bond 
issue  
 value of the debt instruments – PLN 540 million, 
 the instruments were reached for repeatedly, 
depending on the advancement in individual 
investment tasks under the adopted investment 
programme, 
 maturity terms – maximum 15 years, 
 grace period for loans – no longer than 7 years, 
 cost – WIBOR 3M and WIBOR 6M + margin of max. 1 p.p.  
Wrocław 
Investment loan 
agreement between the 
city and the consortium 
of BRE Bank, ING Bank, 
and Nordea Polska  
 loan amount – PLN 500 mln, 
 lending period – 14 years, 
 grace period – 2 years, 
 interest rate – WIBOR 3M + margin of 0.99 p.p. 
 
Source: the author’s own study. 
 
 
Figure 1. Forfaiting mechanism used in the construction of the stadium in Gdańsk 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
The most important element of this puzzle was the transfer of ownership of 
the stadium from the municipality to a municipal company BIEG 2012. After 
this operation Gdańsk was holding only 25% of the shares. As a result, BIEG 
2. performance of service  
 
BIEG 2012/ debtor 
General 
contractor/ 
service provider 
Municipality of 
Gdańsk/ 
creditor/ 
guarantor 
 
Bank 
consortium/ 
forfaiter 
1. signing a 
commercial contract 
3a. transfer of 75% of 
shares in the venue 
4. sale  
of the debt at 
a discount 
3b. establishment of the debt  
 5. payment for the debt 
 6. payment for the service 
 7a. repayment of 
debt with interest due 
 7b. repayment of debt with interest due in 
the event of the debtor's insolvency 
was obliged to pay its share of PLN 375 000 000 and transfer these funds to the 
municipality. As the company did not have such funds available, the 
municipality decided to sell this debt to Bank Pekao SA. That institution, under 
a forfaiting agreement, repaid the debt to Gdańsk, reduced by an appropriate 
discount, which made it possible to pay the contractor for the construction of the 
stadium. In exchange, BIEG is obliged to pay off the debt to the banks in 
instalments for the next 15 years. Initially, only interest – ca. PLN 26 000 000, 
but beginning from December 2012 – principal and interest payments of ca. 
PLN 43 000 000 per year. Altogether, for the PLN 375 000 000 provided by the 
banks, BIEG has to repay ca. PLN 600 000 000. The interest rate depends on the 
WIBOR rate and now totals ca. 7% including bank margin. Thus, BIEG became 
a kind of “financial vehicle”, used by the city to obtain the required funds and 
simultaneously ensuring tax effectiveness of the project. 
The forfaiting arrangement does not transfer the risk of insolvency to the 
forfaiter. The stadium was a risky business for the banks, so the venue was not 
even encumbered with a mortgage. BIEG was not a sufficiently credible partner 
for the lending consortium, so under the agreement the municipality is 
responsible for timely repayment of debt in the event of difficulties. Should 
BIEG stop repaying its debt, the forfaiting agreement would be terminated and 
the municipality would have to pay off the debt with interest accrued within the 
specified time limit. That is why Gdańsk continues to support the municipal 
company, aware that BIEG's troubles will in fact mean difficulties for the city. 
Support is provided in several ways.  
First, the municipality decided to supply capital to the company every year. 
For example, in December 2012 Gdańsk acquired BIEG's shares for ca. PLN 
35 000 000, which allowed the company to pay the instalment due to the 
consortium. The municipality also supplies other links in the chain financing 
BIEG's activities: 
 pays for promotion of the city to the football club Lechia Gdańsk, 
which plays matches in PGE Arena and leases the stadium from the 
operator, which in turn supplies BIEG; 
 pays to the operator for advertising during major events held in the 
stadium. 
It is therefore difficult to say whether the choice of forfaiting by the 
municipality of Gdańsk was the best possible choice from the financial point of 
view. The city bears the entire financial risk, which is only apparently 
distributed over the newly established entities. The chief advantage is the 
somewhat different approach to forfaiting in terms of local government debt. 
Wrocław and Poznań resorted to more traditional forms of financing. 
Wrocław consciously resigned from bond issue opting for a bank loan. The 
decision was mainly driven by the restrictions built into the Act on Bonds. The 
loan was found to be a simpler instrument in terms of both the process of 
accumulating the contract-related documentation, and in the funds disbursement 
and repayment (i.e. the disbursement and the contract-required and law-required 
documentation). The aspects which weighed on the decision included the option 
of early loan repayment which does entail additional costs, as would have been 
the case with bond redemption before the contractually specified date.  
Modernisation of the City Stadium in Poznań was one of the investments the 
city pursued in preparation for the Euro 2012. The funds for implementation of 
the investment programme came largely from loans, typically obtained for the 
entire investment programme as a whole, and not for individual projects. Since 
the stadium project took several years to complete, it was financed from 
numerous debt instruments. Over the time, the city took loans and issued bonds 
of the 15-year maturity type, though in practice the crediting term did not exceed 
10 years.  
 
Resume 
 
Little time has passed since the close of the Euro 2012, hence arriving at a 
clear opinion on the operators’ efforts is difficult. For the time being, all arenas 
are generating a deficit, yet the representatives of their operators emphasise that 
the effectiveness of managing sites of that size should be assessed in a long time 
perspective. Each of the operators has adopted the deadline of at least 3 years to 
reach the break-even. In order to attain the set goal, the operators strive at 
maximizing the income from sports and non-sports activities, reducing the 
operating costs, increasing the durability of the facility and consequently making 
it more attractive to event organisers. All those elements determine the potential 
of generating income in the long term. 
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